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Abstract
Background: Evidence suggests that cost sharing (i.e.,copayments and deductibles) decreases health expenditures but also
reduces essential care. Value-based insurance design (VBID) has been proposed to encourage essential care while
controlling health expenditures. Our objective was to estimate the impact of broader diffusion of VBID on US health care
benefits and costs.
Methods and Findings:We used a published computer simulation of costs and life expectancy gains from US health care to
estimate the impact of broader diffusion of VBID. Two scenarios were analyzed: (1) applying VBID solely to pharmacy
benefits and (2) applying VBID to both pharmacy benefits and other health care services (e.g., devices). We assumed that
cost sharing would be eliminated for high-value services (,$100,000 per life-year), would remain unchanged for
intermediate- or unknown-value services ($100,000–$300,000 per life-year or unknown), and would be increased for low-
value services (.$300,000 per life-year). All costs are provided in 2003 US dollars. Our simulation estimated that
approximately 60% of health expenditures in the US are spent on low-value services, 20% are spent on intermediate-value
services, and 20% are spent on high-value services. Correspondingly, the vast majority (80%) of health expenditures would
have cost sharing that is impacted by VBID. With prevailing patterns of cost sharing, health care conferred 4.70 life-years at a
per-capita annual expenditure of US$5,688. Broader diffusion of VBID to pharmaceuticals increased the benefit conferred by
health care by 0.03 to 0.05 additional life-years, without increasing costs and without increasing out-of-pocket payments.
Broader diffusion of VBID to other health care services could increase the benefit conferred by health care by 0.24 to 0.44
additional life-years, also without increasing costs and without increasing overall out-of-pocket payments. Among those
without health insurance, using cost saving from VBID to subsidize insurance coverage would increase the benefit conferred
by health care by 1.21 life-years, a 31% increase.
Conclusion: Broader diffusion of VBID may amplify benefits from US health care without increasing health expenditures.
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Introduction
Health plans, employers, and policymakers are looking for more
effective approaches to control health expenditures. Reductions in
health expenditures can arise from lowering either the costs or the
quantities of health services [1]. While new initiatives have the
potential to lower costs (e.g., increasing efficiency with health
information technology), controlling quantity is likely to remain an
essential component of any expenditure-control strategy. Strate-
gies to reduce health service quantity in the US have typically
targeted providers (e.g., preauthorization review) more than
consumers (e.g., cost sharing). However, because health care costs
continue to increase beyond the US economy’s growth rate and
targeting providers is often expensive and inefficient, increasing
attention is focusing on approaches to lower consumer demand for
health services, such as cost sharing.
Accordingly, cost sharing has become a ubiquitous feature of
the US health care landscape. Nearly three-fourths of workers with
employer-subsidized insurance enroll in plans with three or more
cost sharing tiers [2], and the highest tiers have copayment rates
averaging 36% [3]. While cost sharing is an effective way of
decreasing health expenditures, it may lower demand for essential
care and may lead to adverse outcomes, and therefore may reduce
quality of care [2,4–6]. For this reason, some have proposed the
idea of value-based insurance design (VBID), which varies the
amount of cost sharing according to either the incremental benefits
of health services [7,8] or to their ‘‘value,’’ as defined by the ratio
of incremental benefits to incremental costs [9]. That way, rather
than assigning a drug to a cost sharing tier based on its cost, VBID
would assign it based on its value. For example, cost sharing could
be waived for office visits and procedures necessary for blood
pressure control or lipid reduction in diabetics, which deliver high-
value care, but cost sharing could be increased for positron
emission technology scans for dementia, which deliver low-value
care [10]. Variants of VBID have been adopted by multiple
employers, and its core principle—adjusting patient cost sharing to
promote high-value care and discourage low-value care—has been
endorsed by the Director of the Department of Health and
Human Services Office of Health Reform [11].
Pilot data suggest that VBID is feasible [5,8,12], successfully
modulating the utilization of statins and other common drugs.
While the rationale of VBID may be compelling, it is unclear
whether broader diffusion of VBID is warranted. We used our
validated computer simulation of the US health care system [13]
to ask whether diffusion of VBID to other US health care settings
(e.g., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) could have a
beneficial impact on health care costs and benefits. Because VBID
is one among many possible frameworks for aligning health care
incentives with value (Figure 1), this analysis may constitute one
piece in the broader puzzle of how to use incentives systematically
to encourage high-value care and to discourage low-value care.
Methods
We evaluated two groups of scenarios involving broader
diffusion of VBID. In the first group of scenarios, because cost
sharing is a common attribute of medication coverage, we
examined the effect of applying VBID to pharmacy benefits for
all persons with health insurance in the US. In the second group of
scenarios, we assumed that broader diffusion of VBID extends not
only to pharmacy benefits, but also to other health care services
(e.g., devices, procedures, etc.). Our rationale for performing this
second, more hypothetical group of scenarios is that value
assessment methods in other countries (e.g., UK, Canada,
Australia, Germany) use the same tools for assessing the value of
non-pharmaceutical services that they use for assessing the value of
pharmaceuticals [14], and there is no theoretical rationale for
using distinct methods. Therefore, VBID principles have the
potential to be applied more broadly across health care services in
the US. We define ‘‘cost sharing’’ as any copayment or deductible
that is linked to a particular health service. Therefore, this
definition does not include other types of payments (e.g., patients’
share of insurance premium) or the indirect effects of employer
health expenses on wages.
Within each of these two groups of scenarios, we analyzed the three
following alternative design specifications (‘‘strategies’’) for VBID.
Strategy 1. Do not require VBID implementation to be cost-
neutral (no cost offset). Reduce cost sharing for high-value services
to increase their demand, and do not change cost sharing for
intermediate-value or low-value services.
Strategy 2. Require VBID implementation to be cost-neutral,
without any intended impact on uninsurance (cost-offset value-
based insurance design [COVID] without subsidy for uninsured).
Reduce cost sharing for high-value services to increase their
demand, do not change cost sharing for intermediate value
services, and increase cost sharing for low-value services, to the
extent necessary to offset additional costs from increasing demand
for high-value services. We evaluated budget-neutrality from (A) a
societal perspective (assuming that overall health expenditures
should remain unchanged), (B) a payer’s perspective (assuming
that health plan expenditures should remain unchanged), and (C)
a patient’s perspective (assuming that out of pocket costs should
remain unchanged).
Strategy 3. Require VBID to be cost-neutral, using a surplus
obtained from lowering demand on low-value services to offset
additional costs from increasing demand for high-value services
and to subsidize expansion of health insurance coverage (COVID
with subsidy for uninsured). Similarly to strategies 1 and 2, this
alternative would reduce cost sharing for high-value services,
preserve cost sharing for intermediate value, and increase cost
sharing for low-value services. However, cost sharing for low-value
services would be increased to generate a surplus sufficient to offset
the costs of expanding health insurance coverage.
Strategy 1 more closely approximates current pilot studies of VBID,
whereas the cost-offset alternatives may become more compelling as
forces grow to limit health care spending growth while simultaneously
providing insurance coverage for those currently uninsured.
Definition of Value Strata
We benchmarked three separate tiers of value, each of which
would be linked to a distinct level of cost sharing. We defined ‘‘high
value’’ as any service with an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
(ICER) of #$100,000 per life-year; ‘‘intermediate value’’ as any
service with an ICER between $100,000 per life-year and $300,000
per life-year, or with an ICER that could not be estimated because of
insufficient data; and ‘‘low value’’ as any service with an ICER of
greater than $300,000 per life-year. We chose these benchmarks
because, across a wide range of plausible scenarios and assumptions,
individuals in the US appear to be willing to pay at least $100,000
per life-year for health benefits but are unwilling to pay more than
$300,000 per life-year for health benefits [13,15]. These value tiers
were varied in sensitivity analyses.
Specification of How VBID Could Link Cost Sharing to
Value
We reasoned that a system of linking cost-effectiveness to value
should apply no cost sharing to high-value services (i.e.,
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#$100,000 per life-year), because incentives to reduce the use of
these services are likely to cause adverse outcomes. In contrast, we
reasoned that a system linking cost sharing to value should apply
substantial cost sharing to low-value services (i.e., .$300,000 per
life-year), because incentives to reduce the use of these services are
less likely to harm health, whereas they will reduce costs. For
health services of intermediate value, either because the ICER is
between $100,000 and $300,000 per life-year or because evidence
is insufficient to enable value to be estimated, we assumed that
prevailing levels of cost sharing would persist. We specified three
tiers rather than a higher number of tiers, because this level of
complexity is already accepted in the US health care system (e.g.,
three-tier and four-tier formularies). Although there is evidence
that some therapies consumed in the US are not effective and may
reduce life expectancy (e.g., PSA screening in men over 80), for
our base case analyses we assume all purchased services, even low-
values ones, have some positive effect on life expectancy. In
sensitivity analyses, we considered the possibility that a substantial
proportion of US health services are ineffective.
Implementation of VBID in Computer Simulation
Each year, a simulated individual in our cohort would ‘‘buy’’ an
allotment of health care based on published age-stratified health
expenditure estimates [16]. When VBID is not used (Figure 2), the
amount of health care ‘‘bought’’ was determined solely by age-
and insurance-adjusted health expenditure estimates, and did not
fluctuate systematically with the value of the services that were
bought. When VBID was used (Figure 2), the amount of health
care bought fluctuated systematically with health service value,
equaling the age- and insurance-stratified expenditure multiplied
by a factor reflecting the elasticity of health care demand (i.e., the
extent to which health care utilization is price-dependent) with
changes in cost sharing. In other words, the amount of health care
bought was greater if the services were of high value (#$100,000
per life-year), because cost sharing would be reduced; it was
unchanged if the services were of intermediate value (between
$100,000 and $300,000 per life-year), because cost sharing would
be unchanged; and it was lower if the selected services were of low
value (.$300,000 per life-year), because cost sharing would be
increased.
We estimated the likelihood that services bought were of low,
high, or intermediate value based on the estimated distribution of
ICERs of health care services available in the US. Because this
distribution is not known with certainty, we evaluated different sets
of distributions, using plausibility criteria that mathematically
limited the set of ICER distributions to a comparatively small
Figure 1. General framework for aligning health care incentives with value. Comparative effectiveness provides information about the
incremental benefits and costs of a particular health service. This information is needed for assessing value, typically defined as the ratio of added
benefits to added costs. Aligning demand-side incentives with value preserves consumer choice and avoids supply-side restrictions in payment and
coverage. This process may proceed simultaneously for distinct patient subgroups that may each benefit from the intervention. Only demand-side
incentives are modeled in the current report.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000234.g001
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group. These criteria are described in detail in Text S1, and
included the requirements that health care expenditures estimated
by the simulation under current circumstances must mirror
current health care expenditures and health benefits. Each model
run simulated one million hypothetical patients, which yielded a
reproducibility of approximately 0.01 life-years. The computer
simulation is described in more detail in the Text S1, and is
available from the author upon request.
Results
First, we use our mathematical model to make inferences about
the value of current US health care spending. Second, we describe
the results of analyses that systematically apply VBID but restrict
its scope to pharmaceuticals spending. Third, we describe our
results, systematically applying VBID to all health care spending
regardless of service type.
The Value of US Health Care Spending
Synthesizing evidence about US health care costs and
benefits,our simulation estimated that approximately 60% of
health expenditures in the US are spent on low-value services,
20% of health expenditures are for intermediate-value services,
and 20% are for high-value services. Correspondingly, the vast
majority (80%) of health expenditures would have cost sharing
that is impacted by VBID. Even when we used the model to
explore optimistic assumptions about how health expenditures are
distributed (i.e., a narrow cost-effectiveness distribution, meaning
that health services offered consistently favorable value), a majority
of spending continued to occur on low- and intermediate-value
services (52%), and a majority of spending (54%) continued to
have cost sharing that is impacted by VBID.
Applying VBID to Pharmaceuticals
Applying VBID to pharmaceutical expenditures (Table 1)
increased life expectancy gain attributable to health care from
4.70 life-years to between 4.73 life-years and 4.75 life-years (a
gain of 0.03–0.05 life-years). The magnitude of gain was
similar (0.03 life-years) for two of the VBID design alternatives
(strategies 1 and 2). Strategy 3 resulted in a greater gain (0.05
life-years) because the 0.03 life-years added by lowering copays
for high-value services was supplemented by an additional 0.02
life-years from allowing more people to have access to health
insurance.
Applying VBID to pharmaceutical expenditures (Table 1) had
varying effects on overall health expenditures, depending on its
design. With strategy 1, annual health care spending was elevated
slightly (an increase of $7 per capita, and $2 billion overall)
because the increase in high-value service utilization was not
balanced by a decrease in low-value service utilization. With
strategy 2, low-value copays were increased as necessary to keep
health expenditures constant (21%, keeping societal expenditures
Figure 2. Schematic of computer simulation. Annual health expenditures vary with the amount of cost sharing. Among uninsured and among
insured with prevailing cost sharing, the amount of cost sharing does not have a specified relationship with value. Among those with VBID, cost
sharing falls for high-value services (which results in greater spending on these services) and rises for low-value services (which results in lesser
spending on these services).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000234.g002
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constant; 23%, keeping payer expenditures constant; 26%,
keeping out-of-pocket patient expenditures constant), and annual
health care expenditures remained unchanged or decreased
slightly (to a decrement of $13 per-capita and $4 billion overall),
because the increase in spending was offset by a decrease in
spending on low-value services. With strategy 3, low-value copays
were increased to offset expanding health insurance coverage
(30%), and annual health care costs did not change, because the
increases in spending on high-value services and on expanding
health insurance coverage were offset by a decrease in spending on
low-value services.
Applying VBID to Other Health Services
The hypothetical scenario in which VBID was applied more
broadly across health service types (not just to pharmaceuticals)
resulted in substantially greater gains in life expectancy from
health care (Table 2), and greater potential fluctuations in health
spending. VBID increased life expectancy attributable to health
care from 4.70 life-years to between 4.94 life-years and 5.14 life-
years (a gain of between 0.24 life-years and 0.44 life-years). The
magnitude of gain was similar (0.24–0.25 life-years) for two of the
VBID design alternatives (strategies 1 and 2). Strategy 3 resulted in
a greater magnitude of gain (0.44 life-years), because the 0.24 life-
years added by lowering copays for high-value services was
supplemented by an additional 0.20 life-years from allowing more
people to have access to health insurance. When the subgroup of
people without health insurance was analyzed separately, their life
expectancy gain from VBID was 1.21 life-years (from 3.93 life-
years to 5.14 life-years).
Applying VBID more broadly across health services had varying
effects on societal health expenditures depending on its design
(Table 2). With strategy 1, annual health care costs were elevated
(an increase of $72 per capita, and $22 billion overall), because the
increase in high-value service utilization was not balanced by a
decrease in low-value service utilization. With strategy 2, low-value
copays were increased as necessary to keep health expenditures
constant, and annual health care expenditures were unchanged or
decreased slightly (up to a decrement of $170 per-capita and $48
billion overall), because the increase in spending was offset by a
decrease in spending on low-value services. With strategy 3, low-
value copays were increased to offset expanding health insurance,
and annual health care spending did not change because the
increases in spending on high-value services and on expanding
health insurance coverage were offset by a decrease in spending on
low-value services.
Sensitivity Analyses
Even when we varied important assumptions in the model,
VBID still could offset the incremental costs of eliminating
uninsurance, and could add substantial life expectancy gains from
health care (Table 3). For example, when we explicitly considered
that it will never be possible to estimate the cost-effectiveness of all
health services for all population subgroups, VBID increased life
expectancy by a lesser but still substantial amount (from 4.70 life-
years to 5.01 life-years).
Discussion
Our results suggest that the majority of health spending in the
US health care system goes toward low-value services. Therefore,
broader diffusion of VBID has the potential to raise life expectancy
of the US population by as much as 0.44 life-years without
increasing health care costs. Notably, these benefits could occur
with little or no change in the overall proportion of health
expenses that are paid out-of-pocket, and without increasing the
amount of cost sharing as high as current levels for tier-4
formulary drugs [3]. Limiting VBID to pharmaceuticals reduces
the potential gain, but it is still meaningful (0.03 to 0.05 life-years),
and comes without a corresponding increase in health care costs.
Our analysis has several important policy implications. First,
implementing value-based insurance design has the potential to
increase the benefits conferred by health care without increasing
costs for payers, patients, or society, because decreases in cost
sharing for high-value services may be offset by increases in cost
sharing for low-value services. For example, health plans may
Table 1. Life expectancy gain and health care costs with diffusion of VBID to pharmacy services.
Outcome No VBID VBID
Low-Value Copays
Unchanged
(Strategy 1)
Low-Value Copays Increased to Keep
Spending Constant (Strategy 2)
Low-Value Copays Increased to
Keep Spending Constant and
Expand Insurance (Strategy 3)d
Societal
Perspectivea
Payer
Perspectiveb
Patient
Perspectivec
Life expectancy gain
(life-years)
Estimate 4.70 4.73 4.73 4.73 4.73 4.75
D VBID — 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05
Expenditures, per
capita ($)
Estimate 5,688 5,695 5,688 5,682 5,675 5,688
D VBID — 7 0 (6) (13) 0
Expenditures,
national ($ billion)
Estimate 1,654 1,656 1,654 1,652 1,650 1,654
D VBID — 2 0 (2) (4) 0
Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
aLow-value copays set to 21%.
bLow-value copays set to 23%.
cLow-value copays set to 26%.
dLow-value copays set to 30%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000234.t001
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increase the population benefit from a particular health service
(e.g., statins) by eliminating cost sharing for some patient
subgroups (e.g., those with a 10-y risk of coronary heart disease
.5%), and, if necessary, increasing cost sharing for other patient
subgroups (e.g., those with 10-y risk of coronary heart disease
,2.5%) [17–19]. Second, other incentives for modulating health
service utilization based on value, both on the demand side and on
the supply side (Figure 1), may present similar opportunities for
improving benefits while controlling costs, and should be further
studied. Third, there are many known high-value services, such as
colorectal cancer screening, and eliminating cost sharing for these
services would have great immediate benefits (Table 4). Fourth,
implementing VBID would be facilitated by knowing the
incremental costs and benefits of a wider range of health services,
and adds to the urgency of funding comparative effectiveness
studies [11]. Fifth, there may be effective options for controlling
growth in health care expenditures that are demand- rather than
supply-based, and therefore would not amplify fears about non-
price-based rationing of health care. Finally, cost saving from
VBID has the potential to offset additional expenditures from
expanding health insurance coverage, which is emerging as a
policy imperative and will contribute a distinct gain in benefits
from health care.
Because the value of certain health services (e.g., statins) will
vary by patient subgroup, VBID implementation would some-
times require considering individual patient characteristics, such
as particular diagnoses or indications. However, this added
measure of complexity need not be insurmountable, particularly
if current initiatives expand the use of health information
technology. Indeed, increasing the feasibility of VBID may be a
collateral benefit of rolling out health information technology.
Prevailing numbers of cost sharing tiers could be maintained (i.e.,
3 or 4), but they could be assigned based on value rather than
cost. Electronic medical record systems (EMRs) could enable
clinicians to specify the indication for a drug at the time of
prescription (or could pull this information automatically from
elsewhere in the EMR), much like EMRs enable clinicians to
designate diagnostic codes to inform billing. Furthermore, any
added complexity of considering patient-level characteristics may
be offset by reduced complexity elsewhere. Provider-based cost-
control measures (e.g., utilization review, pre-authorization) are
complex, inefficient, and raise administrative costs, and may
become less important with an increased reliance on demand-
based measures such as VBID.
This is not to say that implementing VBID would be easy. First,
data are currently insufficient to inform many needed analyses,
and the highest-expenditure services should be priority research
areas for comparative effectiveness studies. The necessary research
will often require large sample sizes, numerous subgroup analyses,
and consistent methods. Second, VBID would likely require a
phased roll-out. For example, it could first be implemented for
Medicare pharmacy benefits, second for other high-expenditure
Medicare benefits (i.e., selected devices and procedures), and third
to other government health benefits. If this roll-out is successful,
private payers may then follow suit. Third, exceptions to value-
based cost sharing decisions will often be necessary, as efficiency
may sometimes need to be superseded by equity considerations.
Fourth, as with any incentive system, providers or patients may try
to ‘‘game’’ the system by over-reporting high-value services. This
may result in an increased requirement for auditing some of these
diagnoses. Most importantly, it will never be possible to know the
value of every health care service in every setting, even with
additional research. Uncertainty may exist because of biased,
uncertain, or otherwise inconclusive evidence [20]. However, our
sensitivity analyses suggest that substantial benefit will accrue even
if only a portion of services are amenable to value estimation.
Furthermore, additional funds for comparative effectiveness
research will increase the numbers of services for which value
estimation is possible.
It has been argued that eliminating ‘‘unnecessary’’ services
may alone be sufficient to control health care costs, especially
since as many as one-third of all health services may be
unnecessary [21]. However, many of these ‘‘unnecessary’’
services are likely to confer small benefits for certain subgroups,
Table 2. Life expectancy gain and health care costs with diffusion of VBID to all health services.
Outcome No VBID VBID
Low-Value
Copays
Unchanged
(Strategy 1)
Low-Value Copays Increased to Keep
Spending Constant (Strategy 2)
Low-Value Copays Increased
to Keep Spending Constant
and Expand Insurance
(Strategy 3)d
Societal
Perspectivea
Payer
Perspectiveb
Patient
Perspectivec
Life expectancy gain
(life-years)
Estimate 4.70 4.96 4.95 4.95 4.94 5.14
D VBID — 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.44
Expenditures,
per-capita ($)
Estimate 5,688 5,760 5,688 5,623 5,555 5,688
D VBID — 72 0 (65) (133) 0
Expenditures,
national ($ billion)
Estimate 1,654 1,675 1,654 1,635 1,616 1,654
D VBID — 21 0 (19) (38) 0
Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
aLow-value copays set to 21%.
bLow-value copays set to 23%.
cLow-value copays set to 26%.
dLow-value copays set to 30%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000234.t002
Diffusion of Value-Based Design
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 6 February 2010 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e1000234
and therefore it may be difficult to argue against their use based
on benefit alone. For example, if a biological cancer therapy
costing $100,000 per year delays tumor recurrence by one
month, even if it does not prolong survival, it would be difficult
to argue that it is truly ‘‘unnecessary.’’ In this way, VBID may
offer a feasible template to modulate utilization in accord with
value.
It is important to note that VBID could facilitate negotiations
by payers and employers over drug prices. Drug prices used in
cost-effectiveness analysis should reflect prevailing prices in the
particular location or health system in which the decision will
occur [22]. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio for two drugs
of similar effectiveness but different prices (e.g., a drug with a
negotiated, lower price versus a similarly effective drug with a
Table 3. Sensitivity analyses of incremental life expectancy gain from health care, varying assumptions across plausible ranges.
Outcome
No
VBID VBID
Low-Value
Copays
Unchanged
(Strategy 1)
Low-Value Copays Increased to Keep
Spending Constant (Strategy 2)
Low-Value Copays Increased
to Keep Spending Constant
and Expand Insurance
(Strategy 3)a
Societal
Perspectivea
Payer
Perspectivea
Patient
Perspectivea
Base case Estimate 4.70 4.96 4.95 4.95 4.94 5.14
D VBID — 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.44
Only can estimate value for subgroup of
health services (50% of expenditures)
Estimate 4.70 4.83 4.83 4.83 4.82 4.92
D VBID — 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.22
Elasticity of demand is higher
(20.39 rather than 20.31)
Estimate 4.70 5.05 5.04 5.04 5.03 5.28
D VBID — 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.58
Elasticity of demand is lower
(20.23 rather than 20.31)
Estimate 4.70 4.88 4.88 4.87 4.87 5.02
D VBID — 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.32
Some health care services have completely
inelastic demand (e.g., the 31% of
expenditures for inpatient care)
Estimate 4.70 4.88 4.88 4.87 4.87 5.01
D VBID — 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.31
ICER health service distribution is wider
(SD 1.3 log units rather than 0.8 log units)
Estimate 4.70 4.96 4.95 4.95 4.94 5.14
D VBID — 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.44
ICER health service distribution is narrower
(SD 0.3 log units rather than 0.8 log units)b
Estimate 4.70 4.92 4.91 4.91 4.91 5.11
D VBID — 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.41
ICER health service distribution is not normally
distributed (e.g., uniform distribution)
Estimate 4.70 4.96 4.95 4.95 4.94 5.14
D VBID — 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.44
Many health services are ineffective
(30% of expenditures)
Estimate 4.70 4.96 4.95 4.95 4.95 5.15
D VBID — 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.45
Many health care services are intrinsically
unsuitable for copays (e.g., the 31% of
expenditures for inpatient care)c
Estimate 4.70 5.21 5.20 5.20 5.20 5.35
D VBID — 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65
High-value threshold is $50k/LY rather
than $100k/LY
Estimate 4.70 4.93 4.92 4.92 4.91 5.12
D VBID — 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.42
aUnder base case assumptions, health care confers 4.70 additional life-years and VBID can increase this benefit by up to an additional 0.44 life-years (to 5.14 life-years).
Varying model assumptions changes the magnitude of this gain moderately (from 0.44 y to between 0.22 y and 0.65 y). In these analyses, copayment for low-value
services is assumed to vary as needed in order to keep expenditures constant. For example, assuming greater elasticity of demand would require smaller increases in
low-value copays to offset costs of expanding health insurance.
bNo amount of increased cost sharing on low-value services would be sufficient to offset eliminating cost sharing on high-value services when the standard deviation is
below 0.4 (because the proportion of health spending on low-value services decreases substantially). Therefore, for this particular analysis, we assumed that cost
sharing was increased on both intermediate- and high-value services.
cCopays are increased on remaining services to keep overall cost sharing constant, which magnifies the impact of VBID.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000234.t003
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non-negotiated, higher price) would imply that the higher-priced
drug has extremely low value. Therefore, the higher priced drug
would be designated for a high cost sharing tier, and
manufacturers are likely to negotiate aggressively in order to
avoid this designation.
Our work has notable limitations. We did not consider the
impact of increasing cost sharing for low-income persons, who are
disproportionately impacted and would likely require copayment
subsidies [23]. Our analysis does not consider the incremental
costs associated with the necessary research that would be required
to apply VBID more systematically. There is debate about the
estimate for health care-attributable life expectancy gain that we
used to anchor our analyses (4.70 y). We did not consider annual
caps for deductibles or out-of-pocket spending. Because health
spending is not distributed evenly, spending caps could mute the
impact of VBID. However, it is possible that caps could be
replaced by a more gradual reduction in cost sharing as personal
expenditures increase. We analyze scenarios in which a uniform
cost sharing percentage is applied across all services of similar
value, and some question whether this is a realistic proposition for
higher-priced services (e.g., implantable defibrillators); however, it
is important to note that tiered formularies already apply uniform
cost sharing percentages to drugs regardless of expense. The cost-
effectiveness distribution of health services was assumed not to
vary by patient age. Finally, different subgroups of drugs or
services may have distinct elasticity estimates [2,24,25], and to
keep the complexity in the model manageable, we used a uniform
estimate across services. However, since our model represents a
‘‘population’’ of health care services, including services with
above-average elasticity together with services with below-average
elasticity, this heterogeneity is unlikely to undermine the validity of
our results. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses showed that our
results were robust across a range of elasticity assumptions that
encompass much of the reported variability in elasticity by service
type.
Indeed, a major methodological strength of this work is that
it aims to represent the ‘‘population’’ of health services in the
US, rather than aiming to represent only particular health
services. Much like how studying a population of patients may
yield more generalizable inferences than studying one or two
individual patients, our approach enables us to ask policy
questions about the health care system that are more
generalizable and have more public health impact (e.g., should
we waive copayments or deductibles for services with
demonstrated high value?) than the policy questions we could
ask if the model were restricted to particular services (e.g.,
should we waive copayments for ACE inhibitors in diabetics?).
Furthermore, our ‘‘population’’-based approach enables us to
use mathematical modeling to make important inferences
about US health care system overall (e.g., the proportion of
spending on high-value services versus low-value services) that
would not be possible if we considered only individual health
services in isolation.
Our results suggest that society spends a majority of its health
dollars on low-value services. Consequently, VBID offers the
promise of saving money (by discouraging the use of low-value
services) while increasing health (by encouraging the use of high-
value services), and the money saved by VBID is sufficiently great
to help fund universal insurance. Our results raise the broader
question of whether other systematic methods of linking value to
incentives may yield substantial life expectancy gains at little or no
additional cost.
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Table 4. Cost-effectiveness and use of selected interventions in the Medicare population.
Intervention Cost-Effectiveness (Cost/QALY) Implementation Value
Influenza vaccine Cost saving 40%–70% High
Pneumococcus vaccine Cost saving 55%–65% High
Beta-blockers after myocardial infarction ,$10,000 85% High
Mammographic screening $10,000–$25,000 50%–70% High
Colon cancer screening $10,000–$25,000 35% High
Osteoporosis screening $10,000–$25,000 35% High
Management of antidepressant medications #$30,000 40%–55% High
Hypertensive medication $10,000–$60,000 35% High
Cholesterol medication as secondary prevention $10,000–$50,000 30% High
Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator $30,000–$85,000 100,000 cases per year High
Dialysis in end-stage renal disease $50,000–$100,000 90% High
Lung volume-reduction surgery $100,000–$300,000 10,000–20,000 cases per year Intermediate
Left ventricular assist devices $500,000–$1.4 million 5,000–100,000 cases per year Low
Positron-emission tomography in Alzheimer’s disease Dominated 50,000 cases per year Low
Adapted from Neumann et al., 2005 [10].
QALY, quality-adjusted life year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000234.t004
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Editors’ Summary
Background. More money is spent per person on health
care in the US than in any other country. US health care
expenditure accounts for 16.2% of the gross domestic
product and this figure is rising. Indeed, the increase in
health care costs is outstripping the economy’s growth rate.
Consequently, US policy makers and providers of health
insurance—health care in the US is largely provided by the
private sector and is paid for through private health
insurance or through government programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid—are looking for better ways to
control health expenditures. Although some health care cost
reductions can be achieved by increasing efficiency,
controlling the quantity of health care consumed is an
essential component of strategies designed to reduce health
expenditures. These strategies can target health care
providers (for example, by requiring primary care
physicians to provide referrals before their patients’
insurance provides cover for specialist care) or can target
consumers, often through cost sharing. Nowadays, most
insurance plans include several tiers of cost sharing in which
patients pay a larger proportion of the costs of expensive
interventions than of cheap interventions.
Why Was This Study Done? Cost sharing decreases
health expenditure but it can also reduce demand for
essential care and thus reduce the quality of care.
Consequently, some experts have proposed value-based
insurance design (VBID), an approach in which the amount of
cost sharing is set according to the ‘‘value’’ of an intervention
rather than its cost. The value of an intervention is defined as
the ratio of the additional benefits to the additional costs of
the intervention when compared to the next best alternative
intervention. Under VBID, cost sharing could be waived for
office visits necessary to control blood pressure in people
with diabetes, which deliver high-value care, but could be
increased for high-tech scans for dementia, which deliver
low-value care. VBID has been adopted by several private
health insurance schemes and its core principal is endorsed
by US policy makers. However, it is unclear whether wider
use of VBID is warranted. In this study, the researchers use a
computer simulation of the US health care system to
estimate the impact of broader diffusion of VBID on US
health care benefits and costs.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
used their computer simulation to estimate the impact of
applying VBID to cost sharing for drugs alone and to cost
sharing for drugs, procedures, and other health care services
for one million hypothetical US patients. In their simulation,
the researchers eliminated cost sharing for services that cost
less than US$100,000 per life-year gained (high-value
services) and increased cost-sharing for services that cost
more than US$300,000 per life-year gained (low-value
services); cost-sharing remained unchanged for
intermediate- or unknown-value services. With the current
pattern of cost sharing, 60% of health expenditure is spent
on low-value services and health care increases life
expectancy by 4.70 years for an annual per person
expenditure of US$5,688, the researchers report. With
widespread application of VBID to cost sharing for drugs
alone, health care increased life expectancy by an additional
0.03 to 0.05 years without increasing costs. With widespread
application of VBID to cost sharing for other health care
services, health care increased life expectancy by a further
0.24 to 0.44 years without additional costs. Finally, if the
costs saved by applying VBID were used to subsidize
insurance for the 15% of the US population currently
without health insurance, the benefit conferred by health
care among these people would increase by 1.21 life-years.
What Do These Findings Mean? The findings of this
study depend on the many assumptions included in the
computer simulation, which, although complex, is a greatly
simplified representation of the US health care system.
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that if VBID were used
more widely within the US health care system to encourage
the use of high-value services, it might be possible to amplify
the benefits from US health care without increasing health
expenditures. Importantly, the money saved by VBID could
be used to help fund universal insurance, a central aim of US
health care reform. More research is needed, however, to
determine the value of various health care interventions and
to investigate whether other ways of linking value to cost
sharing might yield even better gains in life expectancy at
little or no additional cost.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000234.
N Wikipedia has a page on health care in the United States
(note that Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that
anyone can edit; available in several languages)
N Families USA works to promote high-quality affordable
health care for all Americans and provides information
about all aspects of US health care and about US health
care reforms
N The US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid provides
information on the major government health insurance
programs and on US national health expenditure statistics
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